Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 7

October 1996

Give Me Liberty and Give me Death: The Conflict Between
Copyright Law and Estates Law
Michael Rosenbloum

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and
Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss1/7

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Rosenbloum: Give Me Liberty and Give me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright

GIVE ME LIBERTY AND GIVE ME DEATH:
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT LAW
AND ESTATES LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
United States Estates Law revolves around the policy of testamentary freedom. Just as each individual has the freedom to
transfer property inter-vivos, he or she has equal freedom to
determine who will receive property upon his or her death. Estates
law provides several exceptions to the notion of testamentary
freedom, each having underlying policy support. With each
exception, estates law protects family members of the decedent
from disinheritance. The exceptions to freedom of testation, as
determined by the 1969 Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter pre1990 UPCI, include spouse's elective share,1 pretermitted chil4
dren,2 homestead allowances, 3 maintenance or family allowances,
5
and certain items of household (or exempt) property.
The above list of exceptions to testamentary freedom is not
exhaustive. An exception relatively unknown to estate planners is
found in section 304 of the Copyright Act of 1976 [hereinafter the
1976 Act].6 While section 201 of the 1976 Act states that the
ownership of a copyright "may be transferred in whole or in part by
any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable
laws of intestate succession,"7 section 304 speaks otherwise.
While, in general, a copyright interest is treated as personal
property and may be transferred by any means of conveyance, for
a work created before January 1, 1978, the general rule is deceptive. Section 304 of the 1976 Act codifies an exception to the
general rule.

1 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201 (1969).
2 Id. § 2-302.

Id. § 2-401.
4 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-403 (1969).

'Id. § 2-402.
17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
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Under the Copyright Act of 1909 [hereinafter the 1909 Act], the
predecessor to the 1976 Act, a copyright consisted of two twentyeight year terms.' After the first twenty-eight year term expired,
the author could renew his copyright for another twenty-eight year
term.' The only stated purpose of the two-term system was to give
authors a second chance to profit from their creativity had they
previously transferred the copyright in their work to a third party.
The 1976 Act abolished the two-term copyright and replaced it with
a copyright of a duration of the life of the author plus fifty years.10
However, the 1976 Act retained the two-term system for works
copyrighted before January 1, 1978, the date the 1976 Act became
effective." Additionally, the 1976 Act extended the second term
of preexisting copyrights to 47 years, thus making the total
duration of protection for such works 75 years.' 2
Section 24 of the 1909 Act provided that if the author of a
copyrighted work was still living when the first copyright term
expired, he or she had to renew the copyright in order to receive
continued protection. If the author died prior to the end of the first
copyright term, his or her widow, widower, or children could renew
the copyright. If the author died unwed, childless and testate, only
the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, only the author's
next of kin, could renew the copyright.4 3 Similar language is now
found in section 304 of the 1976 Act.'
Section 304 of the 1976 Act, which carries over the renewal
provision of the 1909 Act, places a serious restraint on a copyright
owner's testamentary freedom. The owner of a copyright does not
have the freedom to choose the disposition of his or her copyright
interest after death. While estates law has protected the decedent's

s Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1994)). The two-term system was codified as early as 1710 in the first English
Copyright Statute. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). A brief look at the origin of the renewal

system is noted below.
9 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1994)).
'0 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
1

1 d § 304.

1 Id.

' Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (current version at 17 U.S.C.

§ 304 (1994)).
14

17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
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family against disinheritance, copyright law has provided yet
another safeguard.
United States Estates Law has historically been governed by
state law. Estates law, with a few minor exceptions,1 5 does not
mandate that specific items of personal property remain within the
family. Section 304 of the 1976 Act has mandated that upon
certain conditions, copyright, a species of intangible personal
property, must stay in the family. United States Copyright Law
has impaired the author's testamentary control over his personal
property, and as such has unduly interfered with an individual's
state law right to testamentary freedom.
This Note will detail the origins of the renewal system and the
various rationales for estates law's policy of testamentary freedom.
The focus of the Note will then shift to the conflict between
copyright law's renewal system and estates law's notion of testamentary freedom. Further, based on the policy rationales underlying the renewal system and testamentary freedom, the author will
argue that the renewal provisions found in section 304 of the 1976
Act interfere with estates law in a way Congress never intended.
The Note will conclude with a discussion of the future of the
conflict between copyright law and estates law, including several
measures that estate planners can take to alleviate the conflict.
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW

United States Copyright Law owes its origin to the Constitution.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."1
Congress initially acted upon the copyright power in the First

'5 Pre-1990 UPC § 2-402 provides that certain items of household property, such as
household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects, remain in
the family. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402 (1969).
'6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is commonly referred to as the Copyright
Clause. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution is also considered the Patent Clause
because it affords both copyright and patent power to Congress. Accordingly, the clause is
sometimes referred to as the Copyright and Patent Clause.
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Congress by enacting "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning."17 Since the codification of the Act by the First Congress,
Congress has expanded the rights granted to copyright owners in
the subsequent acts and amendments of 1831, 1870, 1909, 1971,
and 1976.18
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE RENEWAL SYSTEM

To comprehend fully the conflict between estates law and
copyright, one must have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the
origins of the copyright renewal system. Former Register of
Copyrights Barbara Ringer once wrote that "[t]he principle of
copyright renewal is as old as statutory copyright itself."" The
Statute of Anne, the first English Copyright Statute, stated that
the author and his assigns would have exclusive rights in a work
for an initial term of fourteen years from the date of publication.2"
However, if the author assigned his copyright interest during the
first term, all exclusive rights returned to the author, if living, for
a further term of fourteen years.2 ' Copyright renewal was born.
The Statute of Anne originated the first of the so-called "contractbumping"22 situations. In essence, if an author assigned his
copyright during the first copyright term, the Statute of Anne
mandated a return of the copyright interest to the author at the
7

SAct of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). This act gave the "author
'the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending' his 'map, chart,
book or books' for a period of 14 years.' Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 460 (1984) (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124).
' Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat.
212-217; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1994)); Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391; Copyright Revision Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 101-914 (1994)).
1 Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, Study No. 31 (1960), in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 503, 505 (A. Fisher Mem. ed., 1963).
o Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne ch. 19 (Eng.).
21 Id. Under the Statute of Anne, there was no conflict between copyright law and
testamentary freedom. If the author died during the first copyright term, the work entered
the public domain at the end of the first term because only the author was entitled to
ownership of the second term.
' The term "contract-bumping" was coined by Francis Nevins in Francis M. Nevins, Jr.,
The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J.
COPYRIGHT Socy 77 (1988).
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end of the first term, thereby "bumping" the assignment contract
in favor of copyright law.23
When Congress enacted the first copyright statute, it virtually
copied the Statute of Anne's duration and renewal provisions. The
Copyright Act of 1790,24 however, incorporated the holding of the
High Court of Chancery in Carnan v. Bowles. Accordingly, if the
author lived into the second term, an explicit conveyance of termtwo rights made during the first term was valid.'
Arguably, the conflict between copyright law and estates law was
not codified by Congress until 1831. In the Copyright Act of
1831,26 Congress radically changed the renewal structure.2 7 For
the first time, a copyright statute provided for alternative takers of
the renewal interest if the author died during the first term.'
The Act provided that should the author die during the first term,
the author's "widow and child, or children" could renew the
copyright for a further term of fourteen years.' The Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives claimed that the
reason for the change was to prevent the work from falling into the
public domain at a time when the author's "family stand[s] in more
need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them."30
Congress did not include an author's assignee as an individual who
could exercise renewal rights."' This move appeared to remove

2' However, in Carnan v. Bowles, the High Court of Chancery held that if the author
explicitly assigned term-two rights during term one and lived into the second term, the
author could not use the statute to reclaim the copyright. 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch. 1786).
24Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
', Id. The statute provided that if the author was still living at the end of the first
copyright term, the renewal right could be exercised by the author, his executor, administrator, or assignee. Id. (emphasis added).
26 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
2 Along with various other changes, the Copyright Act of 1831 extended the first
copyright term to twenty-eight years, while the renewal term remained fourteen years. Act
of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. at 436-37.
' Under the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Act of 1790, if the author died during
term one, the copyrighted work entered the public domain at the expiration of the first term.
s Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
so Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943) (quoting
Register of Debates, vol. 7, appendix CXIX (1830)). The rationale behind the change was
solely to prevent the work from entering the public domain at the end of the first term.
Today, due to the advent of automatic renewal, which will be discussed below, there is no
threat of the work entering the public domain if the author dies during the first term.
3'1d. at 650.
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the holding of Carnanv. Bowles from United States Copyright Law.
However, in Paige v. Banks,32 the Supreme Court held that if an
author assigned the copyright in his work during the first term
"forever" and the copyright survived into the renewal term, the
assignee was entitled to renew the copyright and own the interest
in the second term.'
As this Note will show, the sole purpose of the renewal system
was to "bump" inter-vivos assignments of copyright and allow the
original copyright owner to profit once again from his or her
creative work during the renewal term. There are two situations
in which copyright law can "bump" a contractual inter-vivos
assignment of a copyright interest. First, if an assignment does not
explicitly assign term-two rights, the author is entitled to recover
the copyright at the end of the first term. Second, even if the
assignment explicitly assigns term-two rights, the death of the
author during the first term acts to "bump" the original assignment, thus allowing the copyright to pass according to the renewal
provision. Legislative history provides that "contract-bumping" was
Congress's sole purpose in providing for copyright renewal. The
silence of history implies that Congress never realized that
provisions for copyright renewal would interfere with an individual's testamentary freedom.
B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF

1909

In the early twentieth century, many copyright scholars began
clamoring for copyright revision.'
Much of the criticism of the
earlier copyright acts was directed at the renewal system. The
criticisms of the renewal system largely were two-fold. First, many
thought it unfair that if an author died during the first term
without spouse or child that the work would fall into the public
domain at the end of the first term.'
Second, the validity of a
term-one inter-vivos transfer of term-two rights remained unclear.3 6 The 1909 Act remedied the first criticism by including the
32 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1871).
Id. at 614-15.
" Ringer, supra note 19, at 508-10.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
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author's executors and next of kin as parties who could renew a
copyright if the author died during the first term unwed and
childless. As this Note will discuss later, it was not until 1943,
however, in the case of Fred Fisher Music Publishing Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons,37 that the Supreme Court addressed the second
criticism.
With the substantial revisions of the Act, the conflict between
copyright law and estates law was further manifested. The 1909
Act stated that "copyright secured under this or previous Acts of
the United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an
instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or
may be bequeathed by will."38 The 1909 Act, however, did not
assure the copyright owner complete freedom over the bequest.
The 1909 Act granted copyright owners two twenty-eight year
copyright terms. 39 The first term began on the date of first
publication; the second term began at the expiration of the first
term if proper application for renewal was made with the copyright
office during the last year of the first term.' Section 24 of the
1909 Act, after providing copyright duration, limited the class of
persons who were entitled to renew, and thus own, the copyright's
second term.41 The 1909 Act stated that:
in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work upon which
the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate body or by an employer for whom such work is
made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall
be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twentyeight years.42

318 U.S. 643 (1943).
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 42, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
201 (1994)).
§ 24, 35 Stat. at 1080-81 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)). The 1909 Act
differs from previous copyright statutes in that both the first and second terms are for
37

twenty-eight years rather than fourteen.
4 Id,
41 Id.

" § 23, 35 Stat. at 1080 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)).
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If a work was of the type listed above, a conflict of laws did not
occur because the author was never entitled to the renewal term.
For all other copyrighted works, section 24 delineated a different
rule for renewal.
Copyright for works other than those listed in the first part of
section 24 could only be renewed by "the author of such work, if
still living, or the widow, widower or children of the author, if the
author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children
be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of a
will, his next of kin.' " Section 24 of the 1909 Act is at the heart
of the conflict between estates law and copyright law.
C. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF

1976

When Congress adopted the 1976 Act, it faced a serious debate
over the duration of copyrights. The renewal system from the
earlier acts created some serious problems that could be corrected
most easily by eliminating the two-term copyright and devising a
duration based on the life of the author. In the legislative history
of the 1976 Act, Congress stated that the adoption of a new
copyright duration was "by far" the most important goal in
copyright revision. 44 Congress settled on a new duration for
copyright of the "life of the author plus fifty years."' However,
the new copyright duration only applies to works created on or
after January 1, 1978.46 Congress stated that eliminating the
inequities of the renewal system was one of its primary reasons for
changing copyright duration to one based on the life of the author.47
Id.
"H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5749.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
"Id.
Congress did not replace the two-term system for works created prior to 1978
because to do so would have created possible impairments of existing expectations and
contractual relations. See Mark F. Radcliffe, Copyright Ownership Issues, in ADVANCED
SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 1995, at 243 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3941, 1995) (explaining reasons behind
choice to maintain two-term system for works created prior to 1978).
47 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Seas. 134 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5750. Congress stated that:
One of the worst features of the present copyright law is the provision for
renewal of copyright. A substantial burden and expense, this unclear
4
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1. Ownership of Copyright. The author of a work protected by
copyright law is the initial owner of the copyright in that work.'
Section 202 of the 1976 Act explains that ownership of copyright
substantially differs from ownership of the material object in which
the work is fixed. Section 202 states that "[t]ransfer of ownership
of any material object.., in which the work is first fixed, does not
of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object." 9 Accordingly, a copyright is not transferred simply by
transferring a material copy of the underlying work; nor does
transfer of copyright convey property rights in a material object.'
2. Carryoverof the Renewal System. Because the new copyright
duration of the life of the author plus 50 years exclusively applies
to works created on or after January 1, 1978, Congress included
section 304 of the 1976 Act. Section 304 maintains the copyright
renewal system for works created prior to January 1, 1978.
Accordingly, the renewal system continues to present problems for
estate planners.5 1
Along with retaining the two-term system for subsisting copyrights, Congress increased the duration of the renewal term to 47
years, thereby granting copyright owners of works created prior to
1978 a copyright monopoly of 75 years.5 2 Section 304 maintained
the same procedures for renewal as were found in section 24 of the
1909 Act including the provision that the renewal right was
granted only to those falling within the author's statutory successor

and highly technical requirement results in incalculable amounts of

unproductive work. In a number of cases it is the cause of inadvertent
and unjust loss of copyright. Under a life-plus-50 system the renewal
device would be inappropriate and unnecessary.
Id. Among the other reasons for change was that life expectancy had dramatically risen
between 1909 and 1976, and many authors would live to see the end of their copyright
monopoly. Id.

17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).

50 Id.
"' Francis M. Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and
Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77 (1988).
2 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
53 However, in 1992, Congress enacted the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, which
eliminated most of the renewal procedures. The Renewal Act will be discussed in more
detail below.
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class." Section 304 of the 1976 Act, and its predecessor in the
1909 Act, are the main focus of this Note. The testamentary
freedom of copyright owners is undermined by the language of
these provisions.
In addition to carrying over the renewal system for works created
prior to 1978, Congress retained several other provisions of the
1909 Act. Section 201 of the 1976 Act roughly parallels section 28
of the 1909 Act. Section 201 grants the copyright owner the
freedom to transfer the copyright, in whole or in part." It is
paradoxical that Congress specifically grants freedom of transfer in
section 201, yet codifies section 304 which severely undermines the
copyright owner's freedom to transfer the copyright after death.
3. Divisibility of Copyright. The 1909 Act granted copyright
owners several exclusive rights.6 Under the 1909 Act, however,
the copyright monopoly was indivisible, meaning that a copyright
owner could not transfer individual exclusive rights to a third
party. Upon a transfer of copyright to another, the entire copyright
monopoly was transferred. For example, a copyright owner was
unable to transfer the exclusive right to prepare a derivative work
without transferring all of the exclusive rights granted to the
copyright owner in section one of the 1909 Act. 7

17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994). As with the 1909 Act, the statutory successor class includes
the author if he is still living, the widow, widower, or children if the author is not living, the
author's executors if the author, widow, widower or children are not living, or the author's
next of kin, in the absence of a will. Id.
"17 U.S.C. § 201(dX1) (1994). The statute states that "[tihe ownership of a copyright
may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law,
and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of
intestate succession." Id. This language is similar to section 28 of the 1909 Act except for
the new provision that copyright may pass through intestacy.
5Act
of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1994)). Section one of the 1909 Act granted the copyright owner the exclusive right to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work, to translate the work or create
derivative works, to perform the work publicly, and to reproduce and distribute to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the
copyrighted work if it is a sound recording.
" A common example of a derivative work is a movie based on a novel. Under the 1909
Act, if a copyright owner wished to have his novel made into a movie by a third party, he or
she was forced to transfer the entire copyright monopoly. Accordingly, the assignee would
also have the right to publish and vend copies of the assignor's novel. Today, the 1976 Act
allows copyright to be divided and permits transfer of the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works, thereby allowing the copyright owner of the underlying work to maintain
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The 1976 Act substantially changed this aspect of copyright law.
Section 201(d)(1) of the 1976 Act provides that copyright may be
transferred "in whole or in part."58 Subsection (d02) provides that
"[amny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright... may be
transferred... and owned separately. The owner of any particular
exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the
protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this
title."59 Thus, a copyright owner may transfer specific rights
granted by the 1976 Act without transferring his or her entire
monopoly. As with transfers of entire copyright interests, if an
author conveys divided rights during the initial term and fails to
survive into the renewal term, the renewal provision "bumps" the
conveyance whether it was inter-vivos or by will.
4. Termination Rights. The renewal provisions created by the
1909 Act gave copyright owners the right to "recover" their
copyright after transfer. A copyright owner who transferred his or
her copyright during its first term was entitled to renew the
copyright and thus effectively recover the copyright after the first
term had expired. When Congress enacted the 1976 Act, it wanted
to retain the idea of copyright recovery without the rigid requirements of the renewal system.'
Section 203 of the 1976 Act grants copyright owners a right to
terminate transfers. 1 Congress stated that such a provision was
necessary "because of the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's
value until it has been exploited." 2 Section 203 allows copyright
owners of works created on or after January 1, 1978 to terminate
a transfer of copyright, or any copyright interest, at any time
during a five-year period beginning at the end of the thirty-fifth

the copyright monopoly in all other exclusive rights granted by the act.
17 U.S.C. § 201(dXl) (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 201(dX2) (1994).
60 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740-44.
61 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Seas. 124 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C-.AN.
5659, 5740. Accordingly, the policy rationale for termination rights is virtually the same as
the underlying policy of the renewal system.
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year after the execution of the transfer." Copyright owners of
works created prior to 1978 may exercise their termination right
during a five-year period beginning at the end of the fifty-sixth year
from the date the copyright was originally secured or beginning on
January 1, 1978 if the end of the fifty-sixth year has passed."'
Termination is not automatic. Rather, specific procedures are
necessary effectively to terminate a transfer.M
As with the provisions for renewal of copyright found in section
24 of the 1909 Act and section 304 of the 1976 Act, only a class
defined by the act may exercise the termination right. If the
copyright owner dies during the first term, the termination interest
is owned and may be exercised by the author's widow, widower,
children or grandchildren.6 With the termination right, Congress
is striving to keep the creativity of the author in his family. The
major difference between termination rights and renewal rights for
estate planning purposes is that transfers by will 7 or transfers by
the copyright owner's successors" may never be terminated.
Termination rights, therefore, maintain the existence of the
"contract-bumping" feature of copyright law by allowing the author
or his statutory successor class to nullify existing contracts between
the original copyright owner and third parties. However, by
disallowing termination of transfers made by will, Congress has

a 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).

If the transfer contains the right of publication, the five-year

period begins at the end of the thirty-fifth year after the date of publication or at the end of

the fortieth year after the date of transfer. Id.
" 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994). Accordingly, works created prior to 1978 have a double
benefit. First, the renewal system allows the original copyright owner to recover the
copyright interest for the renewal term. Second, if the original copyright owner, after
recapturing the copyright for the second term, assigns the copyright to a third party, he or
she may again recover the copyright beginning at the end of the fifty-sixth year.
See 17 U.S.C. § 203(aX4) (1994) (providing procedures for termination).

17 U.S.C.

§§ 203(aX2), 304(cX2) (1994). If the copyright owner had no children, the

widow or widower owns the entire termination interest. If there are surviving children and
a widow or widower, he or she owns a one-half interest and the other one-half interest is

divided among the living children and the children of any deceased children of the copyright
owner on a per stirpes basis. Id.

For clarity, it should be noted that termination classes,

unlike renewal classes, apply to works created prior to January 1, 1978 and works created
on or after January 1, 1978.
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5740.
7
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bypassed the conflict between copyright law and estates law.69
5. Preemption With Respect to Other Laws. Section 301 of the
1976 Act provides that Federal copyright law preempts state
law. 70 Due to the preemption clause, one could argue that there
is not a conflict between the 1976 Act and state probate codes;
where Federal copyright law governs, state law must give way.
This argument lacks merit, however, because the legislative history
of section 301 explicitly states that the purpose of the section is to
"preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes
of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works
coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law." 71 Estates
law does not fall into the category of those laws preempted by
section 30172 because it does not offer protection "equivalent to
copyright."
III. ESTATES LAW
Estates law is the branch of law that governs the planning and
transfer of property at death. The United States Supreme Court,
in the case of Irving Trust Co. v. Day,7 found that donative and
testamentary transfers are not constitutionally protected rights, but

In addition, testamentary freedom is not impaired by termination rights because if an
inter-vivos transfer of copyright, or any copyright interest, is made, the copyright owner no
longer owns the copyright or copyright interest. Therefore, as with any other personal
property, once the property has been transferred inter-vivos, the same property may not be
later transferred by will or pass through intestacy.
70 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994), which provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any such work underthe common law or
statutes of any State.
Id. 71
(emphasis added).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1479,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5746 (emphasis added).
7 State granted "common law" copyright is an example of a law that is preempted by
Federal copyright law.
73 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
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rather are statutory in nature.7 4 The court also found that the
state has the power to "limit, condition, or even abolish" testamen-

tary transfers.75
The Supreme Court's ruling in Irving Trust Co. suggests that
estates law is to be controlled by state law. An in-depth study of
individual states' estates law is beyond the scope of this Note. For
present purposes, this Note will examine the pre-1990 UPC, which
has been adopted in fifteen states since its enactment in 1969.76
A. TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM

Adam Smith once wrote that "[tio give a man power over his
property after his death is very considerable, but it is nothing
[compared] to an extension of this power to the end of the
world." 77 Following this premise, testamentary freedom underlies
United States Estates Law. "It is often said that the principle of
testamentary freedom dominates the law of the United States." 78
Historically, the justifications for the notion of testamentary
freedom have been several.7 9
First is the belief that individuals have a natural right to
This view gained judicial recognition in Shriners
bequeath.
Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,sc where the Supreme

Id. at 562.
Id.
7' Fifteen states have adopted the 1969 Uniform Probate Code: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah. UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.LA 1 (Supp.
1996).
7 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 467 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1766).
7
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective,in DEATH, TAXES
14
75

AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 14 (E. Halbach ed., 1977).

' For a complete history of testamentary freedom, see Adam J. Hirsch & William KS.
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing the dead
hand and the rule against perpetuities).
80 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990). The court stated that the notion of testamentary rights as
purely statutory stemmed from feudal England where only the king owned real property.
"During the decline of feudalism, Parliament enacted the Statute of Wills to grant citizens
the lawful right to devise real property... [hience, devising property came to be regarded
as a right created by statute, not a 'property' right inherent in the common law of England."
Id. at 67. But the court then stated that "[t]hat analysis is inapplicable in our society where
feudalism never existed and where property rights rest on an express constitutional
foundation that is distinguishable from the common law roots of feudal England." Id. at 68.
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Court of Florida stated that the right of testation is not purely a
creation of statute but, like property rights, is grounded in natural
law.8 ' The natural law theory had some opponents. William
Blackstone, for example, contended that individuals solely had a
natural right to transfer property during life, for he believed that
one lost all property rights upon death because nature protects only
the living. 2
A second justification is the belief that testamentary freedom
motivates individual saving and investment. This theory revolves
around the belief that testamentary freedom adds value to
property, and if that value were taken away, there would be less
incentive to amass property. Richard Posner calls this theory
"wealth maximization. " '3 Opponents of this theory offer a variety
of reasons for the maximization of wealth other than the motivation
to bequeath.8"
A third rationale given for testamentary freedom is simply that
such freedom allows for more intelligent estate planning.'
Testamentary freedom, according to this theory, allows the testator
to weigh the varying needs of his family.'
One significant
problem with this justification is the length of time that often
87
passes between will execution and the death of the testator.
Another problem is that many testators put very little time and
even less thought into their estate plan."
Yet another justification for testamentary freedom is that estates

81
82

Id. at 67-68.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 10-11 (London

1765-69).
3
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13-115 (1981). Posner believes that
as the value of property decreases, people will accumulate less property. Hence, the total
amount of wealth will decrease. Id.
'See generally JOSIAH WEDGWOOD, THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE 213-216,232 (Ralph
A. Brown ed., 3d ed. 1971) (stating that factors such as power and prestige motivate
individuals to gain excess wealth). Wedgwood further believes that testamentary freedom
may lead to a reduction of amassed wealth because beneficiaries may forego producing
personal wealth in expectation of a devise or inheritance. Il at 207-08.
8WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.1, at 88 (1988).
B Id.
87

JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 75-76 (4th

ed. 1990).
88 See generally Mary L. Fellows, In Search of DonativeIntent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1988)
(discussing how estates law seeks to find testator's true intent).
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law would be difficult to police if it were otherwise. It has been
said about property that "[i]f we prevented them from bestowing it
in the open and explicit mode of bequest, we could not prevent
them from transferring it before the close of their lives, and we
should open a door to vexatious and perpetual litigation.""
However, a fundamental notion exists in civilized societies that the
populace will follow the laws imposed upon them.
The notion of testamentary freedom is at the core of United
States Estates Law. The language of the 1976 Act limits the class
that can renew a copyright after the first term has expired. The
renewal provision has mandated that copyrights in author's works
remain in the author's family. As will be discussed below, the
Uniform Probate Code and individual states' probate codes have
taken great strides to ensure that the family is protected in
fundamentally different ways.
B.

STATE LAW LIMITS ON TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM

The pre-1990 UPC places several limits upon freedom of
testation. While each of the limitations has a distinct policy
rationale, the major policy behind each is to protect the family from
intentional or unintentional disinheritance. Estate planners are
bound to know the limitations on testamentary freedom provided
in their state's probate code. However, very few estate planners
know of the additional limitation imposed by copyright law.
Section 304 of the 1976 Act, while providing that copyright must
stay in the author's family, disregards state law's already expansive
protection of the family.
1. Spouse's Elective Share. Virtually all common law property
states have elective share statutes. 90 Community property states
0 WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 718 (Penguin Classics
1985) (1793).
0 Georgia is the only common law property state that does not have an elective share
statute. Instead, Georgia has a species entitled "year's support." Under this system, the
surviving spouse and minor children are entitled to an undetermined amount to maintain
their standard of living for a period of twelve months from the death of the decedent.
Application is made for a certain amount, and if the amount is unchallenged, that amount
is set aside for the surviving spouse and minor children. If the amount is challenged, the
applicant has the burden of proving the amount necessary for a year's support. See GA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 53-5-1, 53-5-2 (1995) (providing for year's support).
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do not have elective share provisions because in these states,
surviving spouses are automatically entitled to fifty percent of
property obtained during marriage.9 1 The comment to the pre1990 UPC stated that "[o]ptional sections adapting the elective
share system to community property jurisdictions were contained
92
in the preliminary drafts, but were dropped from the final Code."
The provision would have applied to situations where a married
couple had amassed little property during marriage.
Generally, elective share laws provide that a surviving spouse
can, in the case of an unfair inheritance, elect to take a statutory
share of the decedent's estate. The pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code
grants the surviving spouse a one-third share of the decedent's
augmented estate93 with certain limitations. 4 The policy underlying the elective share system is to protect the spouse against an
intentionally or unintentionally unfair inheritance.9 5
Section 304 of the 1976 Act grants the widow, widower, or
children, if living, the sole power to renew and, consequently, own
the copyright after the author's death. This provision guarantees
the surviving spouse not only one-third of the decedent's augmented estate, but a substantial portion of the copyright interest in all

of the decedent's copyrights which were in their first term upon the
decedent's death. Under certain circumstances, the fairness of
section 304 cannot be questioned. For example, if the decedent
died with the copyrights and very little other property, it would be
equitable to grant the surviving spouse at least a share of the

91 There are presently eight community property jurisdictions in the United States:

Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
92 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. (1969).

" The augmented estate is defined as the total of: all of the testator's estate, all of the
testator's donative transfers, and everything transferred to the surviving spouse through the
will, gift, or trust. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (1969).
Id. § 2-201, which reads:
(a) If a married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse
has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the
augmented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter
stated.
(b) If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the right, if any,
of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in property in this state
is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.

Id.
05 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. (1969).
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renewal rights. However, elective share and community property
would dictate the same result. 96
If the decedent's estate was comprised of valuable copyright
interests as well as other valuable property, under current
copyright and estates law, the surviving spouse would be entitled
to between one-third and one-half of the probate property, 97 and
at least a share of the copyright interests. The result in this hypothetical is inequitable because the surviving spouse will receive a
windfall that leaves the other will beneficiaries or heirs with only
the remainder of the probate property. The classification of
windfall is not intended to imply that the surviving spouse is
undeserving of the "take." Rather, in this situation, the surviving
spouse is sufficiently provided for through her elective share and
the decedent's testamentary freedom is curtailed.
2. PretermittedChildren. Pre-1990 UPC section 2-302 provides
that if a testator fails to provide for any of his or her children who
were born or adopted after the execution of the will, those children
receive an intestate share of the testator's estate. 9s Intentional
disinheritance of a child is allowed in most jurisdictions. 9
Accordingly, if it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional, if the testator had one or more children at the time of
execution and devised substantially all of his estate to the other
parent, or if the testator provided for the pretermitted child outside
the will, the general rule does not apply and the omitted child may
not claim an intestate share."co Some jurisdictions automatically
revoke a will if a child is born after execution of a will which lacks
10 1
a provision for the contingency.
3. Homestead and Family Allowances. Pre-1990 UPC sections

' In a case where virtually the entire estate consists of copyright interests, the elective
share laws or community property laws would provide that the surviving spouse be entitled
to a share of the copyright interests.

,7 Typically, it is one-third in common law property states and one-half in community
property states.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (1969).
"Louisiana is the only state where a parent is required to leave a certain share of his
or her estate to each child. See LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 1493, 1495 (West 1995) (providing
concept of legitime).
'00 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (1969).
10' See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76 (1995) (providing that birth of child, marriage, or
divorce revokes will unless provision is made in contemplation of event).
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2-401 and 2-403 confer upon the surviving spouse or dependent
children the right to certain sums of money or property out of the
decedent's estate. 2 Both allowances have priority over all other
claims to the estate. 1 3 The homestead allowance provides $5000
to the surviving spouse or dependent children if there is no
surviving spouse.' 4 The family maintenance allowance entitles
the surviving spouse or dependent children to a reasonable amount
of money out of the estate for maintenance during will administration."0 5 One of the main rationales behind these two entitlements
is to guarantee that small estates remain with the surviving spouse
and dependent children." e
4. Exempt Property. Perhaps the most important of the statutory exceptions to testamentary freedom for the present discussion is
the provision for exempt household property. Under pre-1990 UPC
section 2-402, the surviving spouse, and if no surviving spouse,
then dependent children, are entitled to $3500 of household
property.0 7 Like the homestead and family allowances, the claim
to exempt property has priority over all other claims to the
estate. '0
A primary purpose of section 402's exemption of household
property is to "relieve the personal representative of the duty to sell
household chattels when there are children who will have
Section 402 is the only estates law provision that
them."'
requires certain items of personal property to remain in the family.
The renewal provision of the 1976 Act likewise attempts to keep
copyright, a form of intangible personal property, in the family.
The major conflict between these two provisions is that the purpose
behind the exempt property provision is to promote the ease of will
administration, while the 1976 Act solely serves to keep a form of
personal property within the family.

'02

UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-401, 2403 (1969). If there is a surviving spouse, he or she

takes both allowances, thus leaving nothing for the dependent children. Id.
1 Id.
104 Id.

§ 2401.

'06 Id. § 2-403.
'06 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 4 general cmt. (1969).
107 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402 (1969). Exempt property includes household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. Id.
1ld.

'o9UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 4 general cmt. (1969).
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The limitations on testamentary freedom imposed by the pre1990 UPC and individual states' probate codes are sufficient to
ensure the family a proper "take" from the estate of the decedent.
The elective share provisions in common law property jurisdictions
typically provide the surviving spouse with one-third of the
decedent's augmented estate. In community property states, the
surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of all marital (or community) property. While one can argue that the surviving spouse and
dependent children should be entitled to more than the statutory
shares, the renewal provision of the 1976 Act is simply a superfluous addition to the list of limitations already imposed by state law.
C. INTESTACY LAWS

Though of less importance to our present discussion, it is
important to note the conflict between intestacy laws and the
renewal system of the 1976 Act. The comment to the pre-1990
UPC states that the purpose of intestacy laws is "to reflect the
normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his
property at death."11 In general, intestacy laws provide for the
surviving spouse and other heirs of the decedent. The order of
descent under the pre-1990 UPC is the surviving spouse, the
surviving issue of the decedent, the parents of the decedent, the
issue of the parents of the decedent, and then other kin."'
When an individual dies without a valid will, the laws of our
society provide for takers consistent with the perceived wishes of
decedents. Intestacy law directs the passing of property when the
decedent's true wishes are unascertainable. Section 304 of the
1976 Act, unlike intestacy laws, seeks to direct the descent of
personal property inconsistently with the decedent's wishes when
the decedent's true intentions are ascertainable.
IV.

INTER-VIVOS TRANSFER OF THE RENEWAL TERM

Under the 1909 and the 1976 Acts, a copyright owner has been
free to transfer a copyright inter-vivos by any means of convey-

110UNIF. PROB. CODE, art.

I, pt. 1 general cmt. (1969).

III UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103 (1969).
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ance." 2 Prior to the codification of the 1909 Act, a concern was
raised about the inter-vivos transfer of term-two rights during the
first term of a copyright. The language of the 1909 Act provided
that "c]opyright secured under this title ... may be assigned,
granted, or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the
proprietor of the copyright. 113 With the use of the preceding
language, Congress did not address the concern. But, in the
landmark decision of Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons," 4 the Supreme Court held that the renewal term could be
transferred inter-vivos. 116
In FredFisherMusic Co., a copyright owner of a song transferred
his copyright to music publisher, M. Witmark & sons. The transfer
contract, signed May 19, 1917, stated that the copyright owner
assigned to Witmark "all rights, title and interest" in the copyrighted work." 6 The contract further provided for the conveyance of
"all copyrights and renewals of copyrights and the right to secure
all copyrights and renewals of copyrights in the [song], and any and
all rights therein that I [copyright owner] or my heirs, executors,7
administrators or next of kin may at any time be entitled to.""
On August 12, 1939, the first day of the twenty-eighth year of the
first copyright term, Witmark applied for and registered the
renewal copyright. Eleven days later, the original copyright owner
applied for and registered the renewal and later assigned the
renewal term to Fred Fisher Music Company on October 24, 1939.
Fred Fisher Music Company then began to publish and sell copies
of the song. Witmark learned of Fred Fisher's actions and brought
suit to enjoin the conduct.
The question posed to the Supreme Court was whether the 1909
Act nullified the agreement between the copyright owner and
Witmark to assign the renewal term of the copyright during the

12

Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 42, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1994)); 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 42, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1994)).
114 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
"'Id.at 659.
,'Id. at 645.
117 id.
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first term.11 The Court found that, under the 1909 Act, a general assignment of copyright did not assign any rights to the renewal
term.11 9 However, the Court held that if a copyright owner
makes a reasoned choice to assign the renewal term of the
copyright during the first term, the 1909 Act does not nullify that
agreement. 20 The court did not discuss the potential consequences had the copyright owner died during the first term.
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided the case of Miller Music
Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.'2 1 The issue in Miller Music was
whether an inter-vivos transfer of a renewal term in a copyright
was valid if the original copyright owner died prior to the end of
the first term.1" The court held that an assignment of the
renewal term is solely a valid assignment of an expectancy
interest.123 If the original copyright owner dies prior to the end
of the first term, the expectancy interest is never realized. 1"
Accordingly, when an author makes an inter-vivos assignment of
the renewal term and dies during the first term, members of the
statutory class described by section 24 of the 1909 Act are the true
owners of the renewal right.
In 1992, Congress amended the 1976 Act with the codification of
the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992."2 The Renewal Act automatically confers renewal in the appropriate successor or successors
when the first term ends. Under the Renewal Act, if a renewal
application is filed during the twenty-eighth year of the first term
by a member of the appropriate statutory successor class, the
renewal term will vest in that individual at the beginning of the
twenty-ninth year, even if the individual dies before the renewal
term begins. 2 Accordingly, all assignments made by that individual of the renewal term interest will be effectuated.
Prior to 1992, copyright law had never defined the precise

"a Id. at 647.
19 318 U.S. 643, 653 (1943).
'

Id. at 657-58.

'2

362 U.S. 373 (1960).

mId. at 374.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 264-66.
I/d.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss1/7

22

Rosenbloum: Give Me Liberty and Give me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright

1996]

COPYRIGHT LAW AND ESTATES LAW

185

moment when renewal rights vest in the author of a copyrighted
work. Once the renewal rights vest in the author, he or she is free
to make inter-vivos and testamentary conveyances of the renewal
right. Prior to the 1992 amendment, courts differed on the issue of
when the renewal term was deemed to have vested. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
Frederick Music Co. v. Sickler,2 7 held that renewal rights vested
on the date of renewal registration, which could occur at any time
during the twenty-eighth year of the first term. 128 The Ninth
Circuit conversely held in Marascalo v. Fantasy, Inc. 2 that the
renewal rights vest in the author only if he or she survives into the
renewal term. 30 Nimmer proposed yet another option. He stated
that it might be held that renewal vests in the author only if he or
she lives into the renewal term and had previously filed for

renewal. 131
The situation described in Miller Music, above, is a "contractbumping" situation. Copyright law has disregarded the intentions
of copyright owners to assign both terms of copyright during the
initial term if the copyright owner dies during the initial term. In
such a case, copyright law mandates that the statutory class
provided by the copyright act is entitled to the renewal interest.
The same conceptual analysis applies where a copyright owner dies
during the first term leaving a will which devises the copyright
outside of the statutory class. As a result, copyright law strips the
copyright owner of a work created prior to 1978 of the right to
transfer all of his interest in the copyright, both inter-vivos and
upon death.
V. SECTION 304 OF THE 1976 ACT
Provisions for copyright renewal are presently found in section
304 of the 1976 Act.' " Section 304(b), which is of little impor-

'27

708 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

"AId. at 592.

129953 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
'30 Id. at 476.
1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.05(c) at 79-80 (1995).
132

17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994). Recall that the renewal provisions only apply to works created

prior to January 1, 1978.
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tance to the present discussion, extends the renewal term to fortyseven years for copyrights in their renewal term as of January 1,
1978.'33 The focus of this Note, however, is on copyrights that
were still in the first term in the beginning of 1978. Works
copyrighted as early as 1950 fall into the category of works that
were in their first term when the 1976 Act became effective.
However, for present purposes, this Note focuses on works copyrighted between 1968 and December 31, 1977. These works are
still in their first term, and as such are subject to the rules of
renewal found in section 304 of the 1976 Act.
Section 304(a) outlines the statutory successor class who has the
power to renew a copyright. 3 ' The class description is identical
to that designated in section 24 of the 1909 Act. 1' Under current
copyright law, only the author, his or her widow or widower,
'3'Recall that the Supreme Court in Miller Music Corp. v. CharlesN. Daniels,Inc. stated
that the renewal term simply was an expectancy interest in the hands of the copyright owner
during the first term. 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960). However, once a copyright is renewed, the
copyright owner is free to transfer the renewal term by will or inter-vivos assignment under
section 201 of the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994), which provides in relevant part:
'
(a) Copyrights in Their First Term on January 1, 1978.
(1XA) Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on January
1, 1978, shall endure for 28 years from the date it was originally secured.
(B) In the case of(i) any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other
composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the
proprietor thereof, or
(ii) any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as
assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for whom
such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the
further term of 47 years.
(C) In the case of any other copyrighted work, including a contribution
by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other
composite work(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,
(ii) the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author is not

living,
(iii) the author's executors, if such author, widow, widower, or
children are not living, or
(iv) the author's next of kin, in the absence of a will of the author,
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work
for. a further term of 47 years. Id.
Act of March 4, 1909, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304

(1994)).
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or next of kin1 1 7 may renew a copyright.

By limiting the class members who may renew the copyright,
Congress has stripped the copyright owner of the freedom to
transfer his or her copyright by will or otherwise.
Under the 1909 Act, and until recently, the 1976 Act as well,
members of the statutory class who were able to renew copyright
had to follow certain procedures to renew a copyright."3 6 Before
1992, if a copyright owner failed to renew his copyright by following
the procedures prescribed under copyright law, the copyright
expired and entered the public domain. 139 The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 alleviated this inequity. 14° According to the Renewal Act, which has been incorporated into section 304 of the 1976
Act, renewal registration is no longer a condition precedent to
renewal and extension of copyright. Although registration is no
longer required, section 304 provides certain benefits if a renewal
application is made.14 1
VI. "WILL-BUMPING"1 42
Along with creating "contract-bumping," Congress's stated
purpose in the enactment of the copyright renewal provision, the
renewal provision has also created "will-bumping." This Note will
show that Congress did not realize the conflict between copyright's
135 The executors of the author's will serve as fiduciaries for the will beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the executors do not personally benefit from the renewal right; they merely
renew for the benefit of the author's devisees.
S? In the absence of a widow, widower, children, or will, the author's next of kin may
renew the copyright. State intestacy laws will determine who among this class may renew
and in what proportion these individuals shall share the copyright interest.
138 See Act of March 4, 1909, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1994)) (providing for renewal and procedures necessary for renewal).
'L Copyright Office statistics showed that only 20% of all copyrights registered with the
copyright office were eventually renewed.
140 Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 264-66.
141 If registration of copyright renewal is made during the last year of the first term, a
certificate of renewal registration constitutes prima facie evidence as to the copyright's
validity and of the other facts stated in the certificate. In addition, statutory damages and
attorneys fees may be awarded in an infringement action if copyright renewal was registered
prior to the infringement. Id.
1' The term "will-bumping" was coined by Francis Nevins in Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The
Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J.

COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77 (1988).
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renewal provisions and estates law's notion of testamentary
freedom. With the codification of the Copyright Renewal Act of
1992, Congress eliminated some of the inequities of the renewal
system. If the inequities of the "will-bumping" phenomenon are to
be relieved, Congress must once again amend the 1976 Act.
The term "will-bumping" pertains to several situations where a
conflict arises between estates law and copyright law. First, the
term applies to the typical situation where an author of a work
created prior to 1978 devises his or her entire copyright interest to
a person or persons other than the surviving spouse, children,
executors, or next of kin. Another scenario is where the author, by
will, devises the copyright interest to a member or members of the
statutory successor class, but does so in unequal fashion. Yet
another "will-bumping" situation occurs when copyright law
interferes with a will of one of the author's statutory successors to
the renewal right. Before discussing the different "will-bumping"
situations, the origins of "will-bumping" should be explored.
A. THE ORIGINS OF "WILL-BUMPING"

As stated above, the renewal system has been a part of United
States Copyright Law since the first copyright statute was enacted
by Congress only three years after the ratification of the Constitution.1"
"Will-bumping" has been a part of United States
Copyright Law since the Copyright Act of 1831. Since that time,
however, no court has held specifically that the author's will is
"bumped" if the author dies during the first copyright term,
survived by a spouse or children, and leaves the copyright in a
work outside the statutory successor class. Nevertheless, Nimmer
and other copyright authorities agree that "will-bumping" exists.,"
The first cases to discuss the connection between copyright
renewal and the law of wills made it clear that the courts could not
143See Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (providing for an initial term of

fourteen years and a renewal term of a further fourteen years). Under the Copyright Act of
1790, there was not a will-bumping problem because the renewal right could only be
exercised by the author if still living.
I" See DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9.04 at 54-64 (1995) (discussing
copyright renewal rights in author and successor classes).
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find any legislative intent for copyright law to interfere with
estates law. For this reason, courts were forced to use strict
statutory interpretation. In the earliest case, Danks v. Gordon,14
the court did not reach the merits of the plaintiff's case because the
court held that a suit for copyright royalties was a contract cause
of action and not one "arising under" federal copyright law.1
The court, in dictum, stated that even if proper jurisdiction existed,
the plaintiff, as a fiduciary of the copyright owner's estate, did not
have standing to sue because the author's copyrights had been
previously renewed by his surviving spouse and children, who were
members of the statutory successor class. 47 Accordingly, after
the renewal, only the members of the statutory successor class had
standing to sue for copyright infringement.4 5
The next case to arise was Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures
Corp.4 9 The case involved a novel written by Augusta Evans
Wilson. The author died during the first copyright term childless,
unwed and testate. The author's will left the copyright in the work
to several members of her family. In 1915, when the time for
renewal arose, the executors of the will had been discharged.
Under the renewal provision, the author's executors were the class
entitled to renew the copyright. Two of the author's surviving
sisters filed for renewal as the author's next of kin.150 Several
years later, Silverman contacted the author's family in hopes of
making a movie of the novel. Silverman obtained assignments of
the renewal term not only from the two sisters that filed for
renewal, but also from everyone who fell into the class of the
author's next of kin. At the same time, Sunrise Pictures was
planning a movie from the same novel and claimed that the novel
was in the public domain. Silverman sued Sunrise Pictures in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
to enjoin Sunrise Pictures from making the film.

1'4 272 F. 821
'" Id. at 827.
147
Id. at 826.
1

(2d Cir. 1921).

" Id. at 825.

149273 F. 909 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
10 Recall that the author's next of kin is the proper statutory successor

class only if the

author dies without a will.
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The District Court denied the injunction'' and the Second
Circuit reversed and remanded.' 52 The Second Circuit held that
if an author dies unwed and childless during the first copyright
term, the will is "bumped" in favor of the author's next of kin.'"
This result was strange because there was no mention of the
author's executors, who are the correct successor class when an
author dies unwed, childless and testate. The court further held
that where the appropriate successor class is the author's next of
kin, the class members take as tenants in common, so that if one
member renews the copyright, the renewal benefits the entire
class.'" The case was remanded to the District Court with
orders to grant the injunction"
While Silverman was on remand, Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles'"
went before the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York. The facts of this case differ
substantially from the facts in Silverman, yet as will be seen, the
outcome of this case affected the eventual outcome of Silverman.
Knowles dealt with the estate of Will Carleton, the author of
several poems in the late nineteenth century. In 1901, Carleton
filed for renewal of the copyrights of his works. At the time, the
renewal term of copyright was only fourteen years. With the
codification of the 1909 Act, Congress allowed an extension of the
renewal term for subsisting copyrights to twenty-eight years if an
application for such extension was made with the Copyright
Office.' 5 7 Carleton died in 1912 devising all of his property to
Norman Goodrich, who was also named the executor of Carleton's
estate.'"
In 1915, Goodrich applied for the extension for one of Carleton's
works. Goodrich then died, devising all of his property to his wife.
Fox Film Corporation decided to make a film of Carleton's work
"' Silverman, 273 F. at 910.

152

Id. at 914.

'5 Id. at 913.

"I Id. at 913.
'5 Id. at 915.

'5 275 F. 582 (S.D.N.Y 1921), 274 F. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1921).
'" See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 304 (1994)) (providing for extension of renewal term for subsisting copyrights).
'" None of the several opinions in this case suggested that Carleton left a widow or

children.
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and purchased the copyright from Goodrich's widow. At the same
time, Knowles had written and produced a play based upon the
same work. Fox sued Knowles for infringement. Knowles claimed
that the work was in the public domain. When the Second Circuit
handed down its opinion in Silverman, Knowles moved to dismiss
the suit on the grounds that because Carleton died prior to the
extension of the renewal term, he could not devise the extended
renewal term by will and that, accordingly, the only persons who
were entitled to the renewal term extension were Carleton's next
of kin. The District Courts dismissed the suits and the Second
Circuit affirmed. 159
Fox then applied for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case and unanimously reversed the Second
Circuit."6 The Supreme Court held that if an author dies unwed,
childless and testate, only the author's executors are entitled to
renew the copyright because an author's will can never be disregarded in favor of the author's next of kin. 1 '
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Knowles, the District
Court's final order in Silverman again came before the Second
Circuit on appeal.' 62 The Second Circuit, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Knowles, held that where an author dies unwed,
childless and testate, the only person entitled to renew the author's
copyrights is the author's executor. 163 However, if the executor
failed to renew the copyrights, timely renewal by any of the
author's next of kin is valid and acts to the benefit of the entire
class."6 If none of the next of kin renewed the copyright, the
work would enter the public domain at the end of the first term.
The ruling of Knowles remains the law today. The ruling of
Silverman,however, is of questionable validity after the codification
of the 1992 amendment, which provides for automatic renewal.
The 1992 amendment acts to vest ownership of the renewal term
automatically in the appropriate statutory successor class.

Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 279 F. 1018 (2d Cir. 1922), rev'd, 261 U.S. 326 (1923).
Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923).
Id. at 329.30.
1"2Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 F. 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758
"'

10 Fox Film
161

(1923).
'6 Id. at 805.
164/d.
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Accordingly, in a situation like that in Silverman, ownership of the
renewal term would automatically vest in the author's executors
when the first term expires.
In the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1790 and
subsequent copyright acts, only one rationale for the renewal
system has been advanced. Congress realized that when a
conveyance of copyright was made during the first term, neither the
assignee nor assignor could possibly know the extent of success and
profitability of the copyrighted work. Accordingly, the author or
the statutory successors should be given a second chance to profit
from the work.1" This rationale is convincing when protecting
the author from unwise inter-vivos conveyances for consideration
and allowing the author to profit once again from his creativity.
The rationale is not convincing when extended into estates law
because the author's devise is clearly not motivated by the desire
for personal economic gain. The silence of the legislative histories
of the various copyright statutes and the clear "contract-bumping"
purpose of the copyright renewal provision evidence Congress's lack
of intention for the copyright renewal provision to interfere with an
individual's freedom of testation.
B. A "TYPICAL" SITUATION

This section of the Note focuses on the typical situation where a
copyright owner devises a copyright interest outside the statutory
successor class. In such a situation, the renewal provisions "bump"
the author's will in favor of the statutory successors. Consider the
following hypothetical situation.
Jane Smith, a singer-songwriter, was married to John Smith. In
1975, Jane wrote and recorded a popular song entitled "The Dead
Hand.""' By the early 1980's, Jane became a concerned environmental advocate. Jane Smith died in 1985, leaving a will that
devised the copyright in the song to Greenpeace and the rest of her

160Ringer, supra note 19, at 521; NnMWER, supra note 144, § 9.02 at 28.
166 Under current copyright law, the song written by Jane Smith is granted copyright
protection as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
Accordingly, Jane's initial copyright term begins in 1975 and runs for twenty-eight years.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994).
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large estate to her husband John.16 7 Who is entitled to the
copyright interest?
The situation described above is typical primarily for one reason.
Very few estate planners know of the special rules regarding
copyright renewal."' The simple answer to the question posed
is that Greenpeace is the owner of the copyright interest until the
first term expires in 2003. However, under the Copyright Renewal
Act of 1992, which is now incorporated into the 1976 Act, the
copyright renewal term automatically vests in the statutory
successor class when the first term expires." Accordingly, at the
end of 2003, the 1976 Act "bumps" Jane's will, and ownership of the
copyright interest in the renewal term passes to John Smith and
Jane's children (if any), if still living, if not, to Jane's executors as
fiduciaries for Jane's will beneficiaries.
If not for the renewal provision of the 1976 Act, the result would
be quite different. Jane Smith's will would control, thereby
fulfilling her testamentary intent. In such a case, Greenpeace
would be the sole owner of the copyright interest for both the
remainder of the first term and for the entire renewal term. John
Smith would be adequately provided for by the testamentary
bequest of the remainder of Jane's rather large estate. 170 The
inequities of the "will-bumping" phenomenon are quite apparent in
this situation.
C. A SECOND "WILL-BUMPING" SITUATION

We have now seen how the 1976 Act "bumps" the author's will if
the will devises the copyright interest outside the statutory
successor class. The focus now shifts to a situation where the
..
7 For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume the copyright interest was valued at
$100,000 and the remainder of Jane's estate was valued at $1,000,000 at the time of Jane's
death.
18
' Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where EstatesLaw and
Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Socly 77, 78 (1988).
'6 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(aX2XB) (1994) (describing automatic renewal).
'70 Had Jane Smith devised nothing to her husband, elective share provisions or
community property laws would have only entitled John Smith to as much as fifty percent
of Jane's estate. In the present hypothetical, however, John receives not only the $1,000,000
testamentary bequest, but also the renewal term of the copyright interest Jane had devised
to Greenpeace.
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author's will devises the copyright interest to some, but not all
members of the statutory successor class, or to all members of the
class but in an unequal apportionment. The question posed in this
situation is whether the renewal provision of the 1976 Act will
accord the author even this minimal amount of testamentary
freedom.
The first concern in such a situation is to determine which
members of the statutory successor class are entitled to the renewal
right. Recall that the members of the statutory successor class
under section 304 of the 1976 Act include the author's widow,
widower or children, the author's executors as fiduciaries for all
will beneficiaries if the author dies unwed, childless and testate,
and the author's next of kin if the author dies unwed, childless and
intestate. 17 1 If the appropriate successor class is the author's
executors, copyright law does not affect the allocation of the
copyright interest. Rather, the language of the author's will
determines the appropriate takers, and the executors are to
effectuate the author's intent. Similarly, if the appropriate
successor class is the author's next of kin, copyright law is not the
determinant of the allocation of the copyright interest amongst the
members of the class. In this situation, the author dies intestate,
and the applicable state intestacy laws determine the allocation of
the author's copyright interest.
If the appropriate successor class is the author's widow, widower
or children, the apportionment of the copyright interest is not quite
as apparent. Suppose that when Jane Smith died in 1985, she was
survived by her husband John and two grown children. Jane's will
devised her copyright interest to her husband John for life,
remainder to her two children. Would copyright law allow this
allocation?
172
The Supreme Court's decision in DeSylva v. Ballentine
The issue in DeSylva was whether "widow,
suggests not. 173
widower or children" constitutes one or two classes under the
renewal provisions of the 1909 Act. 174 The facts of DeSylva are
17117
172

173

U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
351 U.S. 570 (1956).
The answer would remain "no" if Jane's will had devised the entire renewal right to

her husband
instead of creating a life-tenant/remainderman situation.
74
1

DeSylva, 351 U.S. at 572.
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quite intriguing. After the death of songwriter George DeSylva, his
widow routinely renewed the copyrights in his works when time for
renewal arose. After DeSylva's death, Stephen Ballentine, claiming
to be DeSylva's illegitimate son, sued in Federal District Court for
his share in the renewal terms of the works that were in their first
term when DeSylva died. DeSylva's widow did not dispute
Ballentine's claim to be her late husband's son, but she nonetheless
claimed that Ballentine had no right to share in the renewal terms.
The widow's first argument was that under the renewal system,
the author's "widow or widower" was a separate and distinct class
from the author's children, and as such had priority over all other
claimants.1 7 5 The widow's secondary argument was that even if
the author's "widow, widower or children" constituted only one
class, an illegitimate child of the author was not included in the
statutory successor class.'7 6 The Supreme Court held that the
author's "widow, widower or children" was a single class and that
illegitimate child is a
state parentage law will govern whether1 7an
7
member of the statutory successor class.
The Supreme Court's ruling in DeSylva must not be read too
broadly. The Court did not decide the correct shares to be given to
the members of the "widow, widower or children" class. A court
has never heard this issue, and accordingly, the appropriate
apportionment has never been determined. If a surviving spouse
is the only member of the class, he or she exclusively is entitled to
the renewal rights. Similarly, if the class consists of a number of
children and no surviving spouse, a court would likely rule that
each child takes equally.
If the class consists of a number of children and a surviving
spouse, however, a court would have several options. First, the
court could determine apportionment based on the state's laws of

'"" Id. at 573. In essence, DeSylva's widow claimed that an author's children are only
to renew the author's copyrights after the widow or widower's death.
entitled
6
17 Id. at 580.
177 Id. at 580-81. At the time of DeSylva, many state intestacy statutes allowed

illegitimate children to inherit from their natural father only if the father married the child's
mother and recognized the child as his own. In 1977, the Supreme Court found such statutes

to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
Since 1977, the law has treated illegitimacy much more favorably. An example is the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, which allows a child to inherit from his or her biological parents
regardless of their marital status. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114 (1990).
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intestate succession. If intestacy laws are used, the allocation of
renewal interests would differ from case to case because states
have varying patterns of descent. Second, the court could award
the surviving spouse a one-half interest and the children the other
one-half interest. Yet another alternative would be to allocate an
equal share to each member of the class. Regardless of the choice
the court makes, if the author's will devises renewal rights
inconsistently with that plan, the author's will is "bumped" in favor
of the renewal provisions. Accordingly, an author is not only
barred from devising his renewal rights outside the statutory
successor class, but is likewise barred from determining an
apportionment of the renewal interest to the members of the
appropriate class.
Another common example of a situation where the author's will
provides an allocation of copyright that differs from the renewal
provisions is where the author creates a testamentary trust. Again
suppose Jane Smith died leaving a husband and two grown
children. However, instead of creating a life tenancy for her
husband with the remainder going to her children, Jane created a
testamentary trust designating her husband as the income
beneficiary for life, with the corpus passing to her children upon
the husband's death. In this situation, Jane has attempted to
determine the allocation of the copyright interest in a way that
differs from the renewal provisions of the 1976 Act. Is such an
allocation valid?
Again, no court has conclusively held in the negative, but the
Second Circuit's opinion in Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc.178
implies that a testamentary trust of this sort is invalid. The
preliminary facts of Bartok are largely irrelevant to the present
discussion, 179 but the holding sheds some light on the allocation
problem. The author's will provided that all income from his works
was to be paid to his wife during her life and to his children after
his wife's death.'8° Under a prior agreement, Boosey & Hawkes
'78 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
17'

The preliminary issue before the court was whether the work in question was a

posthumous work. If so, the correct statutory successor class would be the copyright
proprietor, not the author's "widow, widower or spouse." See generally § 24, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909) (providing statutory successor classes for different types of copyrighted works).
180523 F.2d at 942 n.2.
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paid royalties to the decedent's estate, and the estate paid the
royalties directly to Bartok's widow. The court held that for the
remainder of the widow's life, royalties would be paid equally to the
widow and children of the decedent.181
The rulings of the courts in Desylva and Bartok can be read to
indicate that an author cannot deprive his children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of their renewal entitlement as prescribed in section 304 of the 1976 Act. Thus, under the current
state of the law, an author may not allocate his renewal interests
in a way that conflicts with section 304 of the 1976 Act. The
problem is exacerbated because no court has determined the proper
allocation of the copyright interest under the 1976 Act's renewal
provision. Accordingly, estate planners must realize that this area
of copyright law remains unsettled. This details yet another way
that copyright law conflicts with an individual's state law guarantee of testamentary freedom.
D. A FINAL "WILL-BUMPING" SITUATION

The final "will-bumping" scenario does not involve the will of the
author. Rather, it involves the will of a member of the author's
statutory successor class. If an author dies during the first
copyright term, his or her will controls who owns the remainder of
the first copyright term. Suppose an author dies survived by a
spouse and no children. The author devises all his property
including his copyright to the surviving spouse. What happens to
the ownership of the renewal term if the spouse dies before renewal
rights vest?
This situation arose in Capano Music, Inc. v. Myers Music,
Inc."8 2 Capano Music involved ownership of the renewal term in
the song "Rock Around the Clock." The song was co-authored by
Max Freedman and James Myers in 1953.'8 3 In 1962, Max

181Id.
"' 605 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The first copyright term began in 1953 and ran until December 31, 1981. See 17
"Id.

U.S.C. § 305 (1994) (providing that copyright term expires at end of calendar year in which
it would otherwise expire). Prior to the codification of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992,

a copyright could be renewed at any time during the twenty-eighth year of the first copyright
term.

See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994) (providing requirements for renewal of subsisting
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Freedman died, devising his interest in the song to his wife, who
notably was also the executor of the will. Freedman's widow died
on December 28, 1980, three days before the copyright could be
renewed. Her will devised the copyright interest in the song to her
sister, Mollie Goldstein. Goldstein failed to renew the copyright,
but co-author James Myers renewed the copyright. The court found
that Myers's renewal benefited the successor to Max Freedman's
interest. 1' 4 The issue presented to the court was to determine
Freedman's appropriate successor.
The court interpreted section 304 of the 1976 Act very narrowly
in reaching its conclusion. The court held that the renewal rights
did not vest in Freedman himself, or his widow (individually or as
executor of Freedman's estate) because both were dead at the
appropriate vesting point."s
Accordingly, the renewal rights
passed to Freedman's next of kin.l
Mollie Goldstein owned the
copyright interest in "Rock Around the Clock" until the expiration
of the first term on December 31, 1981. After that date, copyright
ownership passed to the author's next of kin. In this situation, the
copyright renewal provisions "bumped" the will, not of the author,
but of the author's widow, who succeeded to copyright ownership
after her husband's death. Capano Music, therefore, stands for the
proposition that whenever the author's spouse, children and
executors die during the first copyright term, the wills of the
successor class members are "bumped" in favor of the author's next
of kin.
VII. THE FUTURE OF "WILL-BUMPING"
As stated above, the provision for copyright renewal and "willbumping" will expire in 2005. In 2005, all works copyrighted under
the 1909 Act will have entered their renewal term, and thus
authors will have complete testamentary control over the disposition of their copyright interests. Because the days of the renewal
system are numbered, it is unlikely that Congress will act to

copyrights).
Hence, the copyright could be renewed as early as January 1, 1981.
1
" Id. at 695.
iM Capano Music, 605 F. Supp. at 695.
I d. at 696.
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remedy the inequities that undoubtedly exist in the administration
of a copyright owner's estate.
One should also note that Congress has never acknowledged that
a conflict of laws exists. Accordingly, before Congress will amend
the 1976 Act to alleviate the problem of "will-bumping," the
problem must be brought to its attention. Congress probably will
not recognize the conflict until a court holds that copyright law
"bumps" an author's will if the author devises his copyright interest
outside the statutory successor class. Although commentators
agree that such a result is inevitable,1 7 with only nine years
before the renewal provision becomes defunct, the chance of a case
arising with proper facts is remote.1 88
Until the renewal system ceases to exist, however, estate
planners must recognize that copyright law imposes a limit on a
copyright owner's testamentary freedom. Armed with this knowledge, the estate planner can attempt to override the renewal
provision's limitations in certain situations. The following discussion is invaluable for estate planning purposes.
The first measure that can be taken only applies to a testator
who dies unwed and childless. In such a situation, the will of the
testator should name a corporate executor who presumably will
exist when the time for renewal arises. Under the Copyright
Renewal Act of 1992, when the time for renewal arises, ownership
of the renewal term will automatically vest in the executor. The
executor, acting as fiduciary, will then distribute the renewal term
to whomever the author's will designates as the appropriate taker.
The estate planner should remind the client that this estate plan
is only valid if the client is unwed and childless at death.
As discussed above, if the testator is married and/or has children,
the renewal provision will ordinarily provide the appropriate
successor[s] to the author's renewal interest. However, there is one
way the estate planner can circumvent the renewal provision of the
1976 Act. If a client wishes to devise his copyright interest outside
the statutory successor class or wishes to, for example, create a life

197See

DAvID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9.04 (1995).
Arguably, copyright law has had a "will-bumping" effect since 1831. However, in the

1 8

165 years since the codification of the Copyright Act of 1831, no court conclusively has held
that a devise outside the statutory successor class is "bumped" by copyright law.
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tenant/remainderman situation, there is a solution. The Supreme
Court's ruling in Fred FisherMusic Co. 18 9 suggests that statutory
successor class members may assign their renewal expectancies to
the author for valid consideration. If such assignments are made,
and the assignors live into the renewal term, the assignments are
valid and binding, just as the author's valid assignment of term two
rights is valid if he or she lives into the renewal term.'g The
author then should be free to make an inter vivos assignment or
devise the renewal term in the copyright to whomever he or she
pleases.1 9 Again, the estate planner must warn the client that
this type of plan will be invalidated if new members are introduced
into the class after the execution of the will. 192
The two plans described above prevent the "bumping" of an
author's will. If the will in danger of being "bumped" is not the will
of the author, but the will of a statutory successor, the estate
planner's options are limited. If the author is survived by a spouse
or children, only those living when renewal rights vest may share
in the renewal interest. Accordingly, if the spouse or children die
before renewal rights vest, any devise of renewal rights is per se
invalid.
If, however, the author dies unwed, childless and testate, the
appropriate successor class is the author's executors, who renew as
fiduciaries of the will beneficiaries. Under the court's ruling in
Silverman,1 93 the author's next of kin may only renew the author's copyright if the author's executors fail to renew. Under the
present system of automatic renewal,19 as long as the author's
executors are still serving when the time for renewal arises, the

189 318
90

U.S. 643 (1943).

If an assignor does not survive into the renewal term, the assignment is inconsequential because the assignor is no longer a member of the statutory successor class.
" Since the Supreme Court's decision in Fred Fisher Music Co., many copyright
assignees have insisted that the author's spouse and children assign their renewal term
expectancies. DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 9.06(C) (1995).
in The United States Supreme Court, in Desylva v. Ballentine, included illegitimate

children in the statutory successor class if the law of the testator's domicile recognizes
illegitimate children as heirs under the state's intestacy laws. A problem could arise for the
estate planner if the author has an illegitimate child, but does not wish to recognize the
child. 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956).
1
273 F. 909 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
1 See text accompanying note 125, supra.
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renewal term vests in the executors as fiduciaries for the author's
will beneficiaries. Consequently, the beneficiary's will should
control even if the beneficiary dies prior to the vesting of the
renewal rights. The role of the estate planner in this situation is
to ensure that the author's executors continue to serve until all
copyrights have been renewed.
If the author dies unwed, childless and intestate, the author's
next of kin is the appropriate successor class. If the will in
question belongs to an author's next of kin, the estate planner is
powerless to prevent the "bumping" of the will in favor of the
renewal provisions. If a member of the next of kin class dies prior
to the vesting of the renewal right, the member is no longer
entitled to the renewal right.
The estate planner's primary weapon in the fight against "willbumping" is a well-informed client. Armed with proper information, the estate planner often can effectuate his or her client's
intent. Although it may be impossible to ensure that the renewal
provisions will not affect the author's will, the estate planner must
inform the client of the possibilities. Today, very few estate
planners are aware of the conflict between copyright law and
estates law. To avoid possible malpractice actions and to better
help their creative clients, estate planners must be aware of the
"will-bumping" phenomenon.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Testamentary freedom is a notion deeply embedded in the society
of the United States. In limiting the categories of individuals with
the power to renew a copyright after the author's death, section 304
of the 1976 Act and its predecessors in earlier copyright legislation
undermine the creative individual's right to testamentary freedom.
A thorough search of legislative histories reveals that the copyright
law's conflict with estates law was never intended. Nevertheless,
courts and commentators, focusing on strict statutory interpretation, have unanimously recognized such a conflict.
The copyright renewal provision has a relatively short life span.
By 2005, all works copyrighted prior to the codification of the 1976
Act will have entered their renewal terms, and hence, the renewal
provision will no longer be a problem for copyright owners and
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their estate planners. Due to the renewal provision's lack of
longevity, and the fact that no court has heard the precise issue,
Congress likely will not amend copyright law to remedy the
inequities that certainly exist. Accordingly, to argue that Congress
should act would be a futile endeavor.
The purpose of this Note has not been to argue that Congress
should amend copyright law to prevent "will-bumping." Rather,
this Note details the "will-bumping" phenomenon and indicates that
although Congress never intended such an inequitable result, "willbumping" is indeed a reality. Further, several means are discussed
to reduce the potential of a "will-bumping" situation. Thus, to plan
the estates of creative individuals properly, copyright owners and
their estate planners must be aware of the renewal provision's
limitation on testamentary freedom and that measures can be
taken to prevent the "bumping" of an author's will.
MICHAEL ROSENBLOUM
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